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had embarked on a discussion as to whether the Chekiang gentry could not take up whole loan, and, if so, under what conditions as to price.
the
Mr. Bland was naturally unprepared with an answer to this novel proposition, and had returned with his uninitialled draft in his pocket.
As reported in my telegram No. 187 of the 6th November, I construed this sudden reaction to mean that Yuan Shih-k'ai had suffered some reverse in his influence, and that the policy of vacillation and obstruction, for which Prince Ch'ing and Chang Chih-tung are respectively distinguished, was again in the ascendant.
I accordingly arranged for an interview with the Prince, which his Highness was not able to grant me before the 8th November.
At this interview I asked his Highness to be good enough to afford me an explanation of the delay which had arisen on the 5th instant, as I should have to report to my Government the causes which had prevented Liang Ta-jén from initialling the draft.
Liang Ta-jên, who was present, denied somewhat lamely that there had been any question of initialling on that day, and explained that he had asked Mr. Bland for information, which the latter was unable to give him. Several details remained to be discussed, and he could not be expected to initial a document which he had not been given time to examine.
I reminded him that it was in principle the exact counterpart of the Tien-tsin- Yang-tsze draft, which he had consented to initial on the 2nd November, and I urged the Prince to state clearly the reasons why an Agreement involving predominant German interests had practically reached finality, while a purely British Agreement was being treated in this manner.
His Highness begged me not to press him too hard. They had no intention of not carrying the matter on; but the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze Agreement must be settled first, and then this could be proceeded with.
I reminded his Highness that this declaration was in flat contradiction of the assurances given by the Board, on the faith of which I had informed His Majesty's Government that the two Agreements would be either signed together, or the purely British undertaking be given precedence, and I again pressed for the causes underlying this attitude.
His Highness being unable to bring himself to describe them, I was on the point of giving an account myself of what I understood the situation to be when Liang Ta-jên came to his Highness' assistance and admitted that the popular feeling 'in Chekiang was the root of the trouble. If the Government acted precipitately, without taking time to explain to the people concerned how matters stood, there might be an outbreak, Some of the leading gentry had been summoned to Peking, and nothing could be done until they arrived.
The Prince endorsed these observations and said again he must have time.
I strongly deprecated the course of action proposed, and contended that the Government should not give way before the agitation of a few interested parties among the provincials, whom I named to his Highness. The difficulty in which the Govern- ment found themselves was of their own making, since they had given ground for this agitation by granting rights to the gentry under the Decree of September 1905, when these very rights belonged already to British enterprise under an Agreement made with Imperial authority.
His Highness interrupted me by saying he knew only too well the past history of the question, and proceeded with as much sungfroid to tell the story as if he had been a As things stood, he passive spectator instead of the chief delinquent in this episode. continued, be could not undertake the responsibility of disregarding the opposition. In face of the Decree of the 20th October, the attitude of the gentry was, as I had said, practically rebellious, but he felt for that very cause that the Government must have an opportunity of reasoning with them. Then, if they would not listen, he had means of dealing with them. I then drew attention to the uselessness of treating with this class of agitators. The experiment of trying to discuss a question reasonably and amicably with the gentry of Shansi was now being tried in the case of the Peking Syndicate, and it was found that they did not wish to listen to arguments. The result would be the same with the gentry of Chekiang, and I could not consent to indefinite delay in proceedings which the Government had already had ample time to explain fully to the province concerned. The obligation at stake lay between the Chinese and British Governments. Other Powers, such as Russia, Germany, and France, had used their Concessions dating from the same period to build foreign railways under foreign control on Chinese soil. His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, had transferred
their rights to purely commercial enterprise, and, after the conclusion of the Shanghae- Nanking Railway Agreement, had supported the wishes of China in effecting far-reaching modifications in the conditions of the Canton-Kowloon Agreement.
Owing to this precedent, China had been able to get still better terms in the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze contract, and the return which she was now making for this friendly treatment was to block negotiations upon which she knew His Majesty's Government set the highest importance. Under these circumstances, I could not authorize Mr. Bland to sign the Anglo-German Agreement before the purely British undertaking was ready for signature, and I had the instructions of His Majesty's Government to this effect.
Another matter in which China was receiving the greatest consideration at British bands was in regard to the modification of the Shanghae-Nanking Railway Agreement. The Board of Communications had been pressing the British and Chinese Corporation to abolish the Foreign Board of Control and to delegate its authority to the Chinese Chairman. The Corporation was prepared to meet the wishes of the Chinese Govern- ment, and an understanding had been arrived at, but I should certainly consider it my duty to advise the suspension of this arrangement until we experienced a more practical evidence of China's good faith in the matter of the Hangchow Railway.
His Highness once more declared that means would be found to effect a settlement, but gave me no indication as to the length of time which this would take.
My impression of this long interview was that the Prince will feel bound to make some effort in our favour, but I am not sanguine that the ground lost by his vacillation can be easily regained. As I left his Highness' residence, Liang Ta-jên joined me, and thanked me for bringing pressure to bear, expressing the view that it would do good if sustained.
I therefore addressed a note to his Highness on the following day, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose, recapitulating my arguments and urging a speedy settle- ment of this affair.
When I called at the Wai-wu Pu to-day I was received by all the Ministers except Prince Ching, and therefore had a good opportunity of impressing upon their Excel- lencies collectively the importance of taking a firm stand against the agitation.
I was informed, in reply, that steps were being taken. A strong order from the Throne had been telegraphed to-day to the Viceroy at Nanking and the Governors at Soochow and Hangehow, commanding them to deal with the opposition, and to report by telegraph the result of their efforts. I was emphatically assured by Yuan Shih-k'ai that the Emperor and Empress-Dowager fully appreciated the situation, and that their Majesties were in complete agreement with the Ministers of the Board that their But the obligation towards Great Britain in this matter must be carried out. Government wanted to settle matters peaceably, and to avoid a calamitous outbreak of public feeling. They could not tell me when the Agreement would be signed, but there was no reason to apprehend that the Tien-tsin-Yang-tsze Agreement would be signed in advance, as they still had to examine the Chinese translation, which would take some time. In the meanwhile they agreed that Liang Ta-jén could proceed with the initialling of the draft, so as to bring it up to the same point as had been reached by the Tien-tsin- Yang-tsze draft.
As regards the opposition which the Chinese Government has to meet, it is only just to say that, although I have had to take up the attitude that it is merely the work of a few agitators, I realize from the press extracts sent to me by His Majesty's Consuls in the Yang-tsze ports that feeling runs very high throughout that region. As reported in my telegram No. 194 of to-day, mass meetings have been held at Shanghae, where native capital to the amount of over 2,500,0001, was promised as forthcoming, and, although the alleged desecration of Wang Ta-hsieh's family tombs was in point of fact averted, there has been the gravest danger of mob violence in one form or another during the past two weeks.
1 have, &c. (Signed) J. N. JORDAN.
Inclosure in No. 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Prince Ching.
Your Highness,
Peking, November 9, 1907. AS I had the honour to inform your flighness yesterday in the course of conver- sation regarding the Soochow-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway negotiations, the draft
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